University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
SourceMex

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

9-4-1991

Expected Negative Impact Of Free Trade
Agreement On Mexican Agriculture
Steven Ranieri

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/sourcemex
Recommended Citation
Ranieri, Steven. "Expected Negative Impact Of Free Trade Agreement On Mexican Agriculture." (1991).
https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/sourcemex/934

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in SourceMex by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 065220
ISSN: 1054-8890

Expected Negative Impact Of Free Trade Agreement On
Mexican Agriculture
by Steven Ranieri
Category/Department: General
Published: Wednesday, September 4, 1991
[Appearing below is an English-language summary of "La Agricultura Mexicana y el Tratado del
Comercio Libre: Mucho que Perder, Poco que Ganar," published in the 08/20/91 and 08/21/91 issues
of El Financiero. The Spanish-language original appears in this issue of SourceMex (09/04/91).] By
Francisco Gomez Maza According to Jose Luis Calva, agricultural economics professor at Mexico's
National Autonomous University (UNAM), Mexico has much to lose and little to gain in agricultural
free trade. In a recent interview with El Financiero, Calva stated that the process could result in the
loss of approximately 10 million ha. currently under cultivation, and the exodus of about 15 million
Mexicans from the countryside. The rural migrants would be expected to seek work in the US, or
move into already overcrowded shantytowns ("cinturones de miseria") surrounding large cities.
Such scenario could be avoided if the trade agreement with Canada and the US includes the same
protocol clause under which Mexico became a member-nation of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT). The clause effectively provides safeguards for Mexican agricultural and livestock
production. However, according to Calva, it appears that trade agreement negotiators are talking
about the complete liberalization of agricultural trade. In addition, the Mexican government has
ignored the abovementioned GATT clause, and unilaterally applied agricultural trade opening
policies with less than positive results for the majority of Mexican farmers. The GATT clause allows
tariffs of up to 50% on agricultural commodities, and permits for imports of nearly all agricultural
products. Meanwhile, the government has largely dismantled the tariff system, and suspended the
import permit requirement on hundreds of agricultural goods. In 1984, 780 of the 882 agricultural
product tariff categories required import permits. By June of 1990, only 48 of 526 categories required
authorization. In June 1991, import permits were required for only 33 categories. Next, in recent
years the government eliminated import tariffs on grain and other agricultural goods. In the first
half of 1990, the weighted average of tariffs applied to agricultural and livestock commodities had
declined to only 3.5%. According to Calva, free trade in agriculture under a trilateral accord would
be unfortunate since most Mexican agricultural products are not and will not be competitive with
Canadian and US counterparts for the foreseeable future. Non- competitiveness is the result of the
huge productivity and technological gap between Mexico on the one hand, and the US and Canada
on the other. For instance, over the past five years, Mexican corn output per hectare averaged 1.7
metric tons, compared to 7 MT in the US, and 6.2 MT for Canada. Labor-time per tonne of corn in
Mexico is estimated at 17.8 days, and in the US, 1.2 hours. Mexico produces 542 kg. of beans per
ha., compared to 1,661 in the US and 1,865 in Canada. Similarly, Mexico yields 3.3 MT of rice per
ha., against 6.2 MT in the US. Mexico's dairy herd produces about 1,365 liters of milk per head per
year. The same figure for the US is 6,224 liters, and for Canada, 5,526. The US-Mexico productivity
gap was already quite impressive prior to the economic crisis of the past decade, and has continued
to increase. In 1988, gross agricultural output value per worker in Mexico was $1,799. The same
figure for the US and Canada was $45,052 and $36,617, respectively. The technological gap can be
summarized by two ratios: tractor-worker and harvester-worker. In the US, the tractor- agricultural
worker ratio is 1 to 1.5, and in Canada, 1 to 1.6. The Mexican figure is 1 to 50. Regarding harvesters
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per worker, the US figure is 209 to 1,000; Canada, 332 to 1,000; and Mexico, 2 per 1,000. For some
products, said Calva, productivity differences among the three nations are much smaller, but
Mexican production costs are higher. In the case of wheat, Mexican average yields surpass those
of the US and Canada, because the wheat crop is irrigated. US wheat production costs are about
10% lower than in Mexico. Contrary to government officials' statements, Calva says Mexico is
not undergoing agricultural modernization, but rather the opposite, or regressive technological
change. Economic stabilization policies in the 1980s led to the decline of agricultural terms of trade.
Decapitalization throughout the agricultural sector accompanied the reduction of real farm income.
According to Calva, terms of trade for agriculture as a whole declined 36% between 1982 and 1988.
For producers of the nation's 10 basic grains, real income dropped about 49%. During the 1980s,
farmers were frequently unable to replace obsolete or broken down machinery. In 1989, 15,780
tractors were functional, compared to 17,723 in 1985. Between 1985 and 1989, fertilizer consumption
fell by 14%. In 1982, improved seed varieties were used in the cultivation of 3.073 million ha.,
compared to 2.188 million ha. in 1989. Between 1982 and 1989, insecticide use fell by 19.8%, and
biological pest-control methods by 54.5%. Meanwhile, public spending on agricultural research was
reduced. Between 1982 and 1987, the budget for Mexico's principal research center, the National
Forestry and Agricultural Research Institute, was reduced by over half, from 4,778 million to 2,096
million pesos (1980 peso=base). In addition to technological differences, said Calva, the three nations
are distinct in terms of the quantity and quality of natural resources. The agricultural workercultivated area ratio in the US is 1 to 61.4 ha, and in Canada 1 to 97.4 ha. The same ratio in Mexico
is 1 to 2.7 ha. Irrigated land as a proportion of total cultivated area comes to 9.6% in the US, 1.75%
in Canada, and 22% in Mexico. In contrast to the grain belt and other immense flatlands used for
agriculture in the US, two-thirds of Mexican farmland is characterized by irregular topography.
Climate and rainfall in the US are more than adequate for stable temperate crop production. The
geophysical location of the US brings sunlight during the grain crop growing season than in Mexico.
Calva pointed out that nothing can change natural resource endowment differentials, regardless of
trade agreement negotiators' skills, or the degree of generosity exhibited by trade partners. Natural
resource deficiencies can be compensated for with superior technology, but the chances of Mexico
surpassing the US and Canada in this area are nil as long as the latter continue to invest heavily
in research and technological innovation. According to Calva, Mexicans must realize that there
are some crops, including corn, in which Mexico will never be competitive. Given the enormous
headstart enjoyed by the US and Canada in agricultural research and development, and current
levels of Mexican spending and achievements in these areas, it is not reasonable to expect Mexico
to be able to compete with US and Canadian producers of most basic grains. Moreover, detailed
analysis reveals the false hopes of free trade supporters who believe Mexico can develop largescale horticultural and tropical fruit production. For instance, Mexican potato production costs
are three times the US average. Costs are also higher for cantaloupe, watermelon, and tomatoes
for processing. For other products, Mexican costs are more or less equal to the US. In the case of
fresh tomatoes, Mexican production costs are lower than in the US. But the Mexican product can
compete in the US market only during the winter season, when US domestic output is inadequate.
At any rate, said Calva, since Mexico already accounts for the lion's share of US tomato imports,
there is little room for expansion. Regarding fruit exports, said Calva, Mexico cannot compete
with the US or Canada. In particular, seasonal fruits, such as apples, pears, plums, and peaches
are not competitive in terms of quality and production costs. Mexican citrus and tropical fruits are
competitive, but market expectations must be limited due to competition from Brazil and other
large-scale producers and exporters. Free trade supporters claim Mexico can compete in the areas
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of coffee and cocoa, since the US and Canada do not produce these commodities. Calva pointed
out that Mexico will not be competing with the US, but rather with Colombia, Brazil, and African
and Central American nations. According to Calva, it is unreasonable to think that US citizens will
pay more for coffee in order to favor Mexican coffeegrowers via a tariff on Brazilian and Colombian
imports. Next, Calva emphasized that rapid expansion of agricultural exports will likely lead to price
decline. Between 1980 and 1986, Third World agricultural export volume rose an average 2.9% per
year, while revenue dropped an average 0.9% per annum. Another issue which concerns Calva is
the difference between government agricultural policies. Federally-funded agricultural research
and farm income support programs have been in place for decades in both the US and Canada. The
productivity gap between Mexico and its northern neighbors is largely the outcome of huge US and
Canadian investments in agricultural and livestock research, and to high levels of technological
innovation. According to the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),
US direct agricultural subsidies in 1988 totaled $39.295 billion, equal to 35% of sectoral GDP. In the
1982-1988 period, subsidies to corn producers came to 32.9% of corn output value. Wheat growers
obtained 45.1% of product value via subsidies. In the cases of rice, sorghum, and milk, the figure
was 48.4%, 37.1%, and 66.1%, respectively. In 1988, Canadian agricultural subsidies came to 43% of
agricultural GDP. In contrast, Mexican subsidies were equivalent to only 2.92% of sectoral GDP in
1988, and have since declined. In Calva's view, Mexican farmers cannot be expected to successfully
compete against US and Canadian counterparts who continue to receive large subsidies, making
investment and technological upgrading possible. Moreover, US and Canadian farmers are the
beneficiaries of decades worth of public sector-financed research and development. Consequently, it
is clear Mexican farmers are being forced to compete under extremely unequal conditions.
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